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Abstract
Van der Vyver’s analysis of rights: a  case study drawn from thirteenth-century 
canon law
In  an important article published in 1988, Johan Van der Vyver challenged the 
prevailing reliance on Wesley Hohfeld’s taxonomy of rights. Hohfeld's division of 
rights into claims, powers, privileges and immunities, Van der Vyver stresses, is 
excessively concerned with "inter-individual legal relations ” at the expense of the 
right-holder's relationship to the object of the right. Van der Vyver proposes 
instead that an assertion of right involves three distinct juridic aspects:
• legal capacity, which is "the competence to occupy the offices of legal subject;
• legal claim, which "comprises claims o f a legal subject as against other 
persons to a legal object";
• legal entitlement, which specifies the boundaries of the right-holder's ability to 
use, enjoy, consume, destroy or alienate the right in question.
This article applies Van der Vyver’s taxonomy to the operations of thirteenth- 
century canon law, and demonstrates that Van der Vyver’s analysis provides 
greater depth than Hohfeld's, in that it considers both the relationship of the 
person claiming a particular right and the object o f that right.
1. Introduction
In the world of American law schools, Wesley Hohfeld seems to have become 
the generally accepted foundation for analyses of rights (Hohfeld, 1923). His
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division of rights into claims, powers, privileges, and immunities enjoys near 
universal appeal in the United States (Hull, 1995:245-281; Singer, 1982:986­
994, 1056-1059). But Hohfeld’s analysis of rights is not the only possible 
approach one might take. Johann Van der Vyver has developed an alternative 
analysis that has much to recommend (Van der Vyver, 1988). Van der Vyver in 
particular has challenged Hohfeld’s analysis of rights as excessively concerned 
with “inter-individual legal relations” at the expense of analysing the 
relationship of the right-holder to the object of the right (Van der Vyver, 
1988:207). Additionally, Van der Vyver suggests that Hohfeld was, to a certain 
extent, disappointed by the language he chose to write in -  English. English (like 
Latin, and unlike some of the other Germanic languages) has failed to develop a 
legal vocabulary that distinguishes between the claim that one rightfully asserts 
and the underlying contents of the right one possesses. Van der Vyver has 
undertaken to remedy these defects, at least insofar as private rights are 
concerned (Van der Vyver, 1988:209-219).
Building on the jurisprudential writings of Jean Dabin (1952); Milhollin (1970) 
and Herman Dooyeweerd,1 Van der Vyver sees the term “right” in English (and 
by extension, subjective ius in Latin) as having three potential meanings. It can 
signify, first, the legal competence or power one has to exercise a particular 
“right”; secondly, it may signify the claim one has to a particular “right”; and 
finally, it may signify the bundle of “entitlements” that comprise the particular 
right. This analysis, in essence, asks three questions:
• Is one legally capable of exercising a particular right?
• Can one protect this right from third-party interference?
• What, precisely, is the range of actions one can take with respect to the object 
of the right?
Inattentiveness to these three questions, Van der Vyver charges, has led to a 
great deal of confusion in modem analytical writing about rights. Van der Vyver 
uses an example drawn from an account of modem property law to illustrate the 
confusion that can result from the failure to draw the proper distinctions. An
1 Writing with the intention o f developing a specifically Calvinist jurisprudence, which would 
be respectftil o f  the proper position o f the person with regard to the state and society, Herman 
Dooyeweerd distinguished three essential aspects to legal rights: (1) the subject o f a right, who 
is a person possessing the legal competence to exercise a right; (2) the legal “object” or 
entitlement, which amounts to the right’s content, and which the person is free to use and to 
enjoy within the limits set by the terms o f  the entitlement; and (3) the legal claim or “interest” 
which the person may assert and which protects the preson from third-party interference. 
Dooyeweerd’s analysis o f rights differs significantly from Hohfeld’s in its emphasis on the 
structural relationships implicated by rights-language (Witte, 1993; Marshall, 1985) I am 
grateful to John Witte, Jr., for introducing me to the work o f  Herman Dooyeweerd.
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author has defined the conception of ownership as “one right consisting of 
various other rights (as well, of course, duties)” (Lewis, 1985:243). This 
definition, however, misses the basic structural relationships implicated by rights 
language. As Van der Vyver (1988:218) puts it:
There is a difference between, on the one hand, the structural relationship o f a 
legal subject and a legal object as against third persons, which structural 
relationship is called ownership, and, on the other hand, the entitlement o f the 
owner and (in the event o f certain iura in re aliena) o f other persons to use and 
enjoy the object concerned.
Like Hohfeld, Van der Vyver would like to confine the meaning of the word 
right to that of a claim. One ought to use words other than “right” (or ius) to 
signify the capacity to exercise a right or to designate the entitlements that 
comprise it.
This article intends to employ Van der Vyver’s analysis of rights as a means of 
studying the juridic structure of thirteenth-century canon law.2 The canon law of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it is increasingly clear, is an important early 
matrix for Western conceptions of subjective rights (Tierney, 1989; 1997; Reid, 
1991; 1996). By subjecting canon law to this sort of analysis, the following 
discussion is intended to reveal three facts about the canonistic rights- 
vocabulary of the thirteenth century:
• Legal competence is often put in terms of having a ius.
• One can, furthermore, identify in the canon law of the thirteenth century the 
same structural relationships that prevail in modem law between right-bearer 
and third parties, and right-bearer and the object of the right.
• The canonistic rights-vocabulary (much like the modem English rights- 
vocabulary) does not make consistently clear the structural distinction 
between the claim portion of a right and the underlying entitlement.
2. Legal capacity
2.1 Van der Vyver on legal capacity
By legal capacity, Van der Vyver (1988:209-210) means:
2 In earlier studies, I have explored the applicability o f Hohfeldian categories o f rights to the 
canon law of the thirteenth century (Reid, 1991:64-72) and the relationship o f ius to polestas, 
facuhas , liberlas, and immunitas (Reid, 1996:312-331).
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a) The competence to occupy the offices o f legal subject, for instance the 
juridic ability to be a spouse, testator, owner o f  property, director o f 
companies, executor or trustee o f an estate, etcetera; and
(b) the competence to exercise the functions and to be the bearer o f the rights 
and obligations emanating from such offices.
Van der Vyver’s analysis implicates two distinct questions:
• Can a particular person be said to possess the juridic capacity “to occupy the 
offices of a legal subject”, that is, is he or she legally empowered to fill a 
particular role in a legal system?
• Can a particular person be said to possess the juridic capacity to exercise “the 
rights and obligations emanating from such offices”?
2.2 The canonists on legal capacity
The canonists used the term ius to signify both aspects of legal capacity. This 
much is clear from their discussions of the ius eligendi, the right to vote. Voting 
was a regular feature of diocesan governance in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries and an entire title of Gregory IX’s Liber Extra (1234) is given over to 
this subject.3 Bernard of Parma, Hostiensis and other leading commentators on 
the thirteenth-century canon law distinguished between an active right to vote 
(ius eligendi active) and a passive right of being elected (ius eligendi passive).4 
The ius eligendi passive corresponds neatly to “the competence to occupy the 
offices of legal subject”. One who had the ius eligendi passive had the capacity 
to be elected to office.
The operation of the ius episcopate, the term the decretalists employed to signify 
the complex of powers, privileges and prerogatives the diocesan bishop could 
exercise in virtue of his office, provides an illustration of the second aspect of 
legal competence, namely the competence to exercise “the rights and obligations 
emanating from such offices”. This is the significance of the phrase the 
decretalists employed when summarizing the powers of office the bishop
3 Bk I, title 6.
4 Bernard o f Parma, Glossa ordinaria, X 1.6.41, v. ipsius, Hostiensis, Lectura, X. 1.6.41, v. non 
reperiatur. In his history o f natural rights, Richard Tuck attempted to demonstrate that 
Medieval canon law lacked a conception o f  active rights (Tuck, 1979:13-15). Tuck’s 
historiography, as it pertains to the nature and function o f  rights in Medieval canon law, has 
been effectively refuted (Tierney, 1983:429-441; Reid, 1991:58-59).
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exercised in virtue of his status as bishop -  they were powers the bishop could 
exercise suo iure, on his own authority.5
The canonists frequently employed synonyms, such as facultas or potestas, that 
also carried the sense of legal capacity or power. The active right to vote, for 
instance, could sometimes be described as a facultas eligendi or a potestas 
eligendi.6 The word ius, however, was used most regularly to signify legal 
capacity, and stood at the centre of a constellation of other terms which gave to 
this usage greater depth and complexity (Reid, 1996:313).
3. Legal claim
3.1 Van der Vyver on legal claim
By legal claim, Van der Vyver (1988:211) means:
A right properly so-called, which comprises claims of a legal subject as against 
other persons to a legal object, is composed of two inherent relationships:
(a) The subject-object relationship-, that is to say, the special relationship 
between the person having a right and the object of his right. This relationship 
finds expression in the fact that the subject may in some or other respect lay 
claim to the object. Within the confines of his right, the subject is entitled to 
apply the object to his own benefit. The subject-object relationship thus entails 
the entitlement of the person having the right to enjoy the object of his right 
and -  still within the confines of his right -  to command the utilisation of the 
object...
(b) The subject-third parties relationship; that is, the relationship between the 
person having the right and all other legal subjects. The content this relation­
ship gives expression to the legitimate expectation of the person having the 
right that the object of his right should be left intact and the exercise of his 
entitlements should be endured by others. Third parties, in a word, are required 
to refrain from any act that would obstruct or hamper the exercise of the 
entitlements included in the subject-object relationship.
5 The bishop’s right to judge his subjects, to correct wrong-doing, to visit the territories of his 
diocese, and to dispense from the rigours o f the law were all powers that could be exercised 
suo iure, by virtue o f  the episcopal office. This stands in contrast with special powers 
individual bishops might be granted from the pope, such as the power to act as a papal legate 
(Figuiera, 1986; Sayers, 1971).
6 See X. 1.6.10 (describing the ius eligendi as a facultas eligendi), and Hostiensis, Lectura, 
X. 1.6.25, v. admittendos (describing the ius eligendi as a potestas eligendi).
Koers 64(2 & 3] 1999:213-222 2 1 7
Van der Vyver's analysis o f rights: a  case study drawn from thirteenth-century canon law
3.2 The ius coniugale as a legal claim
A clear example of the operation of these two aspects of a claim can be found in 
the ius coniugale, the “marital right” (also called the ius matrimoniale). The ius 
coniugale had its origin in the Pauline notion of the conjugal debt. St. Paul wrote 
in his First Letter to the Corinthians:
Let the husband render to the wife what is her due and likewise the wife to 
her husband. A wife has no authority over her body, but her husband; the 
husband has no authority over his body, but his wife. You must not refuse each 
other except by consent, time, that you might give yourself to prayer, and 
return together again lest Satan tempt you because you lack self-control 
(1 Corinthians 7:3-7).
The term that is translated as “due” is the Greek word opheile. Opheile 
unambiguously meant what was owing. It was a debt (Liddell & Scott, 
1940:1277). In the Vulgate, St. Jerome translated opheile as debitum (Noonan, 
1986:42). The sense of what was owing or due was preserved by this translation.
The canonists transformed this debitum from a moral obligation founded on 
Scriptural exhortation into a judicially enforceable right7 (Reid, 1991:80-91). 
The wife had a right to sexual relations with her husband, which the husband 
was legally obliged to respect, and the husband had a right to sexual relations 
with his wife, which the wife was equally obliged to respect (Reid, 1991:80-91).
One sees in the canonistic treatment of the ius coniugale both of the structural 
elements Van der Vyver has identified as forming a claim. First, one sees a 
“special relationship between the person having a right and the object of his 
right” and one sees that “this relationship finds expression in the fact that the 
subject may in some or other respect lay claim to the object”. The marital 
relationship is, indeed, a “special relationship”. Each party to the marital 
relationship, furthermore, can lay claim to sexual relations with the other party. 
This may be a dehumanizing way of describing a marriage. It may be evidence 
of the phenomenon the critical legal studies movement calls the “reification” of 
rights. Nevertheless, it is unambiguous evidence of the operation of claim-rights 
in thirteenth-century canon law.
Secondly, one also sees that “ [t]he content of this relationship gives expression 
to the legitimate expectation of the person having the right that the object of his
7 References to a  ms matrimonii that carry the notion o f a  party’s rights within marriage can be 
found as early as the late twelfth century decretists. The decretist Honorius, for instance, states 
regarding the operation o f the Pauline privilege: “Exciptur tamen casus ubi contumelia 
Creatoris solvit ius matrimonii” (Grimm, 1989:282). Honorius’s point is not that “the law of 
marriage” is dissolved by the contempt the unbeliever manifests, but that the rights o f the 
parties to the marriage are thereby dissolved (cf. Elliott, 1993:132-194, reviewing canonistic 
and theological arguments on the development o f the conjugal debt).
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right should be left intact and the exercise of his entitlements should be endured 
by others” (Van der Vyver, 1988:211). This expectation is seen, for instance, in 
the decretalist analysis of the marriages of serfs, when the decretalists attempted 
to resolve the potential clash between the serfs (and his wife’s) ius coniugale 
and the demands of his feudal lord. A serf owed his feudal lord servitium, but his 
wife also had the right to his sexual performance. When these expectations came 
into conflict, at least some decretalists argued that the wife had a “legitimate 
expectation” that her “entitlements should be endured” by the feudal lord, and 
therefore required the feudal lord to wait until the ius coniugale was satisfied 
before requiring service from his serf.8
4. Legal entitlement
4.1 Van der Vyver on legal entitlement
By legal entitlement, Van der Vyver (1988:212-213) means:
A right, in its subject-object relationship, is made up o f a number o f entitle­
ments ... The word ‘entitlement’ is here chosen to denote the lawfulness or 
legal permissibility o f dealing in a particular way with a legal object -  that is, 
by reason o f the person performing the act having a legal right to that o b je c t..
The entitlements included in a right may comprise one or more o f the 
following: the entitlement to use and enjoy, the entitlement to consume and 
destroy, and some would also say the entitlement to burden or to alienate the 
object o f one’s right.
4.2 Canonistic distinctions between right and underlying 
entitlement
The canonists sometimes distinguished between the claim one had and the 
underlying entitlements one was thereby permitted to exercise in virtue of the 
claim. Perhaps the clearest example of this distinction occurs in discussions of 
the ius ad rem and ius in re. The ius ad rem was the claim one might assert 
against third parties who threatened the security of one’s right (Dondorp, 1991; 
Landau, 1971). The ius ad rem was developed in the context of episcopal 
elections as a device by which a bishop-elect might prevent third parties from 
interfering with his taking office (Benson, 1968:142). The ius in re, then, in the 
context of episcopal elections, would describe the bundle of “rights” or 
“entitlements” the bishop might possess, use, and enjoy (but not alienate) upon 
taking office (Benson, 1968:142).
8 At times o f conflict between the claim of the lord to feudal service and the claim of the wife to 
the sexual companionship o f her spouse, Bernard o f Parma was willing to cede to the wife 
(Reid, 1991.89). Innocent IV rejected Bernard’s position, but Hostiensis largely agreed with 
the author o f the Glossa ordinaria (Reid, 1991:89-91).
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At least occasionally, the decretalists engaged in detailed analyses of the 
contents of the entitlements represented by particular iura, such as the ius 
episcopate. These analyses reflect an uneasiness with the use of the same term, 
ius, to convey both the meaning of a claim and the content of the underlying 
entitlements thus being claimed. Perhaps the most comprehensive example of 
this sort of analysis occurs in Hostiensis’s treatment of the ius episcopate. 
Drawing upon the distinction between genus and species, Hostiensis asserted 
that the ius episcopate was a genus made up of two principal species, the lex 
diocesana and the lex iurisdictionis, and a large number of more “specialized” 
branches, such as “inquisition”, “correction”, and “reformation”.9
In analyzing the content of the ius episcopate in terms of genus and species, 
Hostiensis must have sensed the impropriety of defining the content of a 
particular right in terms of other rights. Properly speaking, following Van der 
Vyver, the content of a right does not consist of other rights, but of subordinate 
entitlements permitting the use of the object of the right in certain instances. The 
failure of Latin to provide a ready equivalent to the English word entitlement, 
however, seems to have stunted development in this direction.
5. Conclusion
This application of Van der Vyver’s analysis of rights, it is hoped, has 
accomplished at least two objectives.
• First, it is clear that the concept of rights deployed by the thirteenth-century 
canonists fits all of Van der Vyver’s categories. The word ius can, in 
appropriate circumstances, mean both legal capacity and legal claim. 
Canonistic analyses of rights, furthermore, as demonstrated by Hostiensis’s 
treatment of the ius episcopate, sometimes distinguished between a particular 
right and the underlying entitlements of which it is comprised.
• This study of Medieval canon law, it is hoped, also demonstrates the 
importance of Van der Vyver’s conception of rights for modem analytical 
jurisprudence. Hohfeldian analysis has a flat quality to it, considering as it 
does only whether a particular right can best be denominated as a claim, a 
power, a liberty or an immunity. Van der Vyver’s analysis has a richer
9 The lex diocesana and the lex iurisdictionis, together, formed the sum of entitlements and 
powers a thirteenth-century bishop might claim and exercise The term lex iurisdictionis is not, 
as one might suspect, related to the power o f jurisdiction. Bernard o f Parma argued that the lex 
iurisdictionis consisted o f  the power to give things away, while the lex diocesana consisted of 
the power to receive things. See Bernard o f  Parma, Glossa ordinaria, X. 1.31 18, v de lege 
iurisdictionis. More satisfactorily, Innocent IV treated this division as an arbitrary distinction 
o f the law. See Innocent IV, Commentaria, X.3 ,35 .1, v, vendicare. Hostiensis’s analysis of the 
two branches is found at Lectura, X.3.37.2, v. oeconomum.
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quality to it, in that it considers both the relationship of the person claiming a 
particular right and the object of that right. Our application of Van der 
Vyver’s categories to thirteenth-century canon law can be utilized in the 
analysis of modem legal systems as well. Johan Van der Vyver has produced 
an analysis of rights that is a worthy successor to Hohfeld.
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